When the popular revolt against the shah turned into the triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini, materialized in the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in February 1979, this new Iran immediately pointed the finger at two main enemies, the United States and Israel. And not even the eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988), which was about survival for the regime but also about building a narrative of national resistance, meant that the great enemies did not remain the same. America did not stop being “the Great Satan”, just as the Jewish State continued to be “the little Satan” in the slogans of demonstrations or in the great revolutionary murals. In fact, the Iraqi Saddam Hussein was then considered, with some logic, to be at the service of the enemies of the Iranian Revolution.
For the American and Israeli leadership, frustrated by the loss of the ally that was Shah Reza Pahlavi, there was never any great doubt about the hostility of those in charge in Tehran, and I’m not talking about the presidents, sometimes even moderates like Mohammed Khatami, but rather the supreme guides, since 1989 Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini. For Americans, the kidnapping of the embassy in Tehran was always remembered, for Israelis the constant threats of the elimination of the Jewish State from the map of the Middle East by figures from the regime were always taken very seriously, even because they corresponded to a real threat, via the groups spread across several countries that act under the orders of Iran, with the Lebanese Hezbollah being the most famous.
For all this, the mere possibility that Iran was trying to develop a nuclear arsenal generated an immediate reaction. In Israel, an unacknowledged nuclear power, the determination to prevent Iran from having the bomb has been shared in the country’s highest spheres for a long time. In the United States, if Barack Obama still signed an agreement limiting civilian use in 2015 during the time of Hassan Rohani (another president considered moderate), Donald Trump never trusted Iran’s real intentions and in his first term withdrew from the agreement. Returning to the White House a year ago, he has already bombed Iranian nuclear facilities for the first time in June 2025 in support of Israel and has now returned to giving orders to attack the Islamic Republic, after an attempt at negotiation that never seemed destined to succeed.
With the American-Israeli attack triggering Iranian retaliation, both against Israel and against Arab countries that host American bases, the possibility of an escalation in the Middle East is immense. There, the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Sunni-Shiite clash, occasional separatism and the jihadist threat come together, as well as the oil issue. That is why the world is looking so closely at what is happening, and there are so many calls for an end to the war and a return to the negotiating table.
But Trump, and also Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, know that the risk of escalation would always exist when there is a forceful action against Iran. The difference is that in 2026 the ayatollas face a triple fragility: the so-called Axis of Resistance, from Hamas to Hezbollah through the Houthis, is weakened by the Israeli response to the October 7, 2023 attack on kibbutzs near Gaza; the country in June 2025 showed limited capacity to respond to attacks from Israel and America, and the popular demonstrations at the beginning of this year in large Iranian cities showed that there is a desire for change among the population, which was only thwarted at the cost of extreme violence by the regime.
Any conflict has an uncertain end and this one is no exception. And the consequences could be terrible, first at a regional level, if there is the much-feared escalation; and even be felt on a global level, if the major trade routes, including the oil-producing Strait of Hormuz, are affected. Despite all this, and the various pressures, attention has to be on the determination, and the means, of those who are fighting. And above all, what do these three weaknesses weigh on the decision-making process of Khamenei and the Iranian leadership, whether they put up extreme resistance or try to save what is possible.
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