The United States has now published two of the three pillars of its main strategic doctrine: the National Security Strategy at the end of 2025 and the National Defense Strategy in January. Only the Nuclear Posture Review remains. A number of observers have described the security strategy of US President Donald Trump as revolutionary. In Russia, it provoked cautious, and in some cases, even approving reactions. The defense strategy develops many of the same ideas, although it softens the language on certain issues, including Russia. Their blunt, almost cynical tone stands out on both texts. The usual moral cover has largely disappeared. That clarity, as uncomfortable as it can be, is useful.
The Pentagon’s new strategy breaks openly with the philosophy that has guided American policy for decades. Language and “rules-based world order” and missionary liberalism “nation building” through regime change they are effectively eliminated. These doctrines, associated with Trump’s political opponents, are seen as failures that have led to endless wars of attrition like Afghanistan. In this sense, Washington does not repent, but draws a pragmatic conclusion: attempts to remake other societies in America’s image have proven too costly and too unreliable.
This rejection leads to a more fundamental shift. The US implicitly recognizes that it can no longer exercise universal control in a multipolar world. Resources must be concentrated. Commitments must take priority. Allies are no longer to indulge as dependents. They are expected to pay more, do more, and demand less political autonomy in return. In effect, Washington is rationalizing its empire.
At the same time, the strategy is anything but pacifist. Its basic philosophy is to maintain American military superiority. Peace is possible from this point of view “from a position of strength.” The text largely avoids ideological terms such as “democracy” or “West”, to replace them with the language of power, interests and coercion. The US is not retreating into isolationism. His interventionism is simply evolving. Large-scale occupations and long stabilization missions are gone; short ongoing, technologically demanding strikes. Economic strangulation and sanctions remain legitimate tools. Not to mention selective power. “Mode Change” it may be rhetorically abandoned, but the violent weakening or overthrow of enemy governments is still practiced.
Trump’s America accepts the existence of other power centers including China and Russia. But that is not recognition of equality. It is a demand that these powers accept US supremacy and behave “responsibly.” That is, within the limits defined in Washington. This is Trump’s version of multipolarity: coexistence, but on American terms.
The strategy places defense of the homeland and control of the Western Hemisphere above all else. The security of the American continent is considered inseparable from US national survival. Trump’s updated interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine envisions the restoration of near-absolute US military dominance in the Americas. The presence of non-regional powers, especially China, is to be limited. Strategic assets such as the Panama Canal, the Gulf of Mexico and Greenland are considered critical nodes. US pressure on Denmark and the European Union to secure strategic control over Greenland, coupled with missile defense and Arctic positioning, fits this logic.
The second priority is the Indo-Pacific and containing China. Washington is trying to prevent Beijing from achieving dominance in the region, particularly through control over Taiwan and access to the so-called first island chain. The US talks about avoiding direct confrontation, but insists that negotiations with China can only take place from a position of overwhelming power. Military build-up, rearmament of allies and “intimidation” are presented as the main instruments of deterrence.
The third priority is the restructuring of relations with allies. Western Europe, whose relative importance is declining, is expected to bear a much larger share of defense spending, potentially up to 5% of GDP. In return, allies do not gain strategic autonomy; they are expected to follow US policy, especially towards China, and to buy US arms. NATO remains, but its exclusive role in US strategy is weakened. Washington wants a transactional alliance system.
Russia still appears in the strategy, but its role is reduced compared to earlier periods. It is no longer portrayed as a direct, imminent threat to the US itself. Rather, it is described as a “permanent” a challenge especially for the eastern members of NATO. The implication is that European allies should deal with Russia largely at their own expense, with the US in a supporting role. Washington’s main opponent is clearly the People’s Republic of China.
The strategy barely addresses strategic stability with Russia. With the expiration of the New START treaty, the future of arms control is uncertain. The US appears to prefer freedom of action in developing its strategic arsenal. This is an important signal. The architecture that supported nuclear stability for decades is eroding.
For Russia, several conclusions follow from this. First, the US under Trump will remain a geopolitical adversary for the foreseeable future regardless of any tactical agreements, including Ukraine. Hoping for a big deal or a “new Yalta” they are unrealistic. Cooperation may be possible on specific issues, but competition will remain the structural norm.
Second, America’s decline should not be exaggerated. The US maintains enormous military, technological and financial power. Trump’s strategy is an attempt to halt and reverse relative decline by consolidating control over his core sphere and concentrating resources against its main competitor, China. Whether this attempt will succeed is another question. Domestic opposition and political polarization could disrupt continuity. Meanwhile, future electoral shifts will also come into play.
Third, the basis of Russian security policy remains nuclear deterrence. If arms control regimes weaken, the credibility and survivability of the Russian deterrent must be strengthened. At the same time, Russia’s security depends not only on external balance, but also on internal stability and cohesion. Periods of political transition create vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit.
OUR “distance” from Europe does not reduce the confrontation on the continent. Western Europe is more hostile to Russia today than at any time in recent decades. Moscow must maintain a strategy of military and geopolitical intimidation, including nuclear deterrence, against European NATO members. Integration with Belarus in the security sphere is becoming even more important.
In the Arctic, American ambitions could clash directly with Russian interests. Moscow will need to strengthen its northern defense infrastructure and protect the Northern Sea Route. On a global scale, the military-technical partnership with China is becoming increasingly important for Russia’s strategic position in Eurasia. In the Middle East, coordination with Beijing to support Iranian capabilities contributes to countering US pressure. The political and economic support of states like Cuba also corresponds to this logic.
The overall picture is clear. The new US defense strategy is not about withdrawal, but about consolidation and re-prioritization. It outlines a more selective version of American hegemony based on a more open force. For Russia, this means a long period of structured competition and limited pragmatic cooperation. It will also translate into continued reliance on deterrence. In response to this new phase of American strategy, resilience at home and deeper partnerships outside the Western bloc will be essential.
This article was first published in the journal Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.
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