In an increasingly volatile world where maritime routes have become arenas of cutthroat geopolitical competition, the new European Ports Strategy emerges as a beacon of vision. Recently announced by the European Commission, this strategy positions ports as pillars of the European Union’s autonomy, proposing an ambitious repositioning, promoting competitiveness, decarbonization and sovereignty in logistics and energy flows.
For a country like Portugal, with an exposed Atlantic coast and ports like Sines, Leixões and Lisbon, this approach is fundamental. In a context in which global trade is reorganized and logistics chains have become instruments of geopolitical power, controlling critical infrastructure has become as important as defending borders.
The most transformative element of this strategy is the approach to security, something that, for decades, has been absent from European port policy. It is recognized that ports are no longer mere commercial hotspots, but have become battlefronts against hybrid threats, including organized crime and terrorism, especially when we consider that the majority of drug trafficking that enters Europe via Portugal originates in Latin America.
In 2024, Portugal recorded a record 23 tons of cocaine seized, mainly in its ports, consolidating the Brazil-Portugal route as a structuring corridor for drug trafficking. Europol reports highlight evasive tactics, such as high-sea transfers using mother ships and daughter boats, which bypass customs controls and increase the risk of armed violence in coastal areas.
This maritime security challenge, however, falls within a broader and more volatile geopolitical context. The war in Ukraine, the intensification of competition between great powers and the melting of the Arctic – which opens up new sea routes potentially dominated by Russia and China – highlight the urgency of a Europe capable of controlling its own “gateways”. Chinese state-owned companies such as Cosco and China Merchants hold significant stakes in strategic terminals such as Piraeus, Hamburg or Valencia, within the Belt and Road Initiative.
Foreign capital, under equitable and transparent rules, is part of the solution, but excessive dependence on external actors in critical infrastructure constitutes a risk in times of global uncertainty.
At the same time, technological dependence raises new concerns. The Chinese company ZPMC dominates between 70% and 80% of the global port crane market, many of which are installed in European ports. In a context where logistical data is equivalent to economic and military intelligence, these dependencies bring risks.
There is another dimension that is often forgotten: ports are central nodes in the European energy transition. Liquefied natural gas terminals, green hydrogen, subsea cables and energy infrastructure offshore increasingly pass through port areas. This means that port security has also become an energy security issue.
The real question, therefore, is not whether Europe needs a port strategy, but whether it will have the political capacity to implement it with the urgency that the moment demands. In a sea of geopolitical uncertainty, whoever controls the ports controls much more than trade: they control the vital arteries of European economic and strategic power.
Write without applying the new Orthographic Agreement.
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