We are in the midst of a changing era. It is not just another economic or geopolitical crisis. The world is going through a profound structural transformation, which simultaneously affects political, diplomatic, commercial, productive and technological dimensions. Global value chains are being reorganized under strategic security criteria, alliances are reevaluated, geopolitics returns to the center of economic decisions and the dispute for technological leadership redefines national strategies.
The first quarter of the 21st century was decisive in this process. China’s accelerated rise altered trade flows, production patterns and technological hierarchies. Its insatiable and growing demand for natural resources has reconfigured the specialization of emerging economies. Its industrial competitiveness has expanded its presence in strategic sectors and its advancement in value chains has taken it to the technological frontier in telecommunications, clean energy, batteries and artificial intelligence. The economic and technological hegemony of the United States, consolidated throughout the 20th century, became increasingly contested.
It is in this environment that the call Donroe Doctrineassociated with President Trump’s new term. Unlike the old Monroe Doctrine or the policy of Big Stickformulated in a context of unequivocal expansion of North American power, the new Doctrine emerges in an opposite scenario, in which that hegemony is contested. This involves reaffirming the primacy of the United States through tariffs, financial sanctions, technological restrictions, diplomatic pressure and even military actions – the most recent, in Venezuela. In other words, it is a policy of containment and defense of strategic space. It does not only apply to neighboring regions, but has been applied to the rest of the world.
More than ever, North Americans see Latin America as their backyard. However, the picture is complex and heterogeneous. On the one hand, Mexico is deeply integrated into North American production chains. On the other hand, Brazil, Chile and Peru, among others, significantly expanded their commercial ties with China, especially through exports of commodities minerals, energy and agriculture. It is a strong dichotomy: while many maintain strong financial dependence on the USA, others have deepened exposure to Chinese financing and investments, especially in infrastructure (often through intermediary countries, such as the Iberians). This diversity implies different degrees of vulnerability and room for maneuver for each nation.
The risks are multidimensional. In an environment of systemic rivalry, the region can become a terrain of indirect dispute between great powers. Pressure for geopolitical alignments reduces decision-making autonomy and increases the cost of sovereign choices. The concentration of exports on primary goods destined for China reinforces an insertion of low technological content and reduced value addition, perpetuating vulnerabilities associated with external dependence and volatility of commodities.
On a technological level, the high dependence on digital platforms and North American infrastructure tends to hamper regulatory capacity on topics such as data, competition, taxation and cybersecurity. This asymmetry has political and diplomatic implications, by expanding external influence on information flows, public opinion and even electoral processes.
At the same time, global transformation opens up strategic opportunities. The reorganization of production chains, driven by geopolitical tensions, creates space for diversifying partnerships and attracting investments. The agreement between Mercosur and the European Union is part of this movement of diplomatic realignment, in which countries seek to reduce concentrated dependencies. Furthermore, Latin America holds central assets for the energy transition and digitalization. The region concentrates around 60% of global lithium reserves, 40% of copper reserves and has relevant rare earth reserves in Brazil. However, it is not enough to expand extraction. It is necessary to go beyond the role of exporter of critical minerals and transform geological advantages into systemic productivity gains, through industrial chains, local processing, technological innovation and human capital qualification.
History demonstrates that moments of geopolitical reconfiguration can be converted into development levers. In the 1940s, in the middle of the Second World War, Brazil was able to negotiate support from the United States for the installation of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN), a landmark in the basic industry. The jump was not just in ore exports, but in national production capacity.
The current challenge is similar, although much more complex. There is no Nazi/fascist axis to consensually oppose. In a world of structural rivalry, the central question is not choosing between Washington or Beijing. THE Donroe Doctrine is part of this systemic reconfiguration of global power. For Latin America, the threat is marginalization or capture by external agendas. The challenge is to transform natural resources and strategic position into productive and technological capacity. It is about building autonomy by increasing systemic productivity in the midst of dispute. The opportunity lies in using competition between powers as a bargaining and diversification instrument. Crisis is opportunity.
* Murilo Ferreira Viana, economist, PhD student in Economics at Unicamp and economic consultant collaborated on this text.
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