Three leaders. Three convictions. Three disappointments.
Putin believed he would crush Ukrainian resistance in a matter of days, confident in Russia’s economic and military superiority. Zelensky was betting that, with the support of the United States and Europe, he would not only repel the invaders but also reconquer Crimea and lead Ukraine to NATO. Trump, during the campaign, promised to end the conflict within 24 hours, if he reached the White House. None of these “certainties” survived contact with reality. The war in Ukraine is now four years old — practically the same duration as the First World War — and continues with no victor in sight.
Since neither side has been decisively defeated, ending the conflict requires negotiations and concessions. It is Trump who is leading this effort today, and the simple fact that an American president needs to lead the discussions exposes, in an embarrassing way, the inability of European leaders to resolve a war fought in their own region.
Trump’s motivations for seeking a deal are, as usual, multiple and not entirely altruistic. Washington wants to create distance between Moscow and Beijing, seen as the United States’ main strategic threat. There is also an interest in normalizing economic relations with Russia — including for the benefit of sectors close to Trump himself. And there is, of course, personal ambition: the White House has already tried to promote the image of a “President of Peace”, a title that, not surprisingly, could contribute to a candidacy for the Nobel Prize.
But the obstacles to peace are formidable.
The first is political and moral. For Zelensky, recognizing that the promises at the beginning of the war were not fulfilled means looking the Ukrainian people in the eyes and admitting that the thousands of deaths, the injured, the destruction and suffering did not produce the promised results.
The second obstacle is structural. There are countries, sectors and individuals that profit from the continuation of the conflict — the military-industrial complex first and foremost, but also political sectors and figures that derive power and relevance from war. This group includes Zelensky himself, whose political future after a peace agreement is, to say the least, uncertain.
The third node is territorial. Putin demands full control of the four Ukrainian regions that Russia invaded and formally annexed, incorporating them into the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Giving up on this point would, in the eyes of the Kremlin, be an unacceptable defeat.
The fourth impasse is about security. Zelensky demands concrete guarantees against future invasions — including the presence of troops from NATO countries on Ukrainian soil. Moscow categorically refuses any formulation in this regard.
Finally, there is the issue of neutrality. Putin conditions an agreement on the partial disarmament of Ukraine and its return to the status of a neutral country, as provided for in Article 9 of the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Ukrainian State of July 1990 — a document that Kiev would prefer to see definitively buried.
The combination of these factors produces an impasse that the United States, until now, has been unable to break. Zelensky is betting that Trump will not abandon the negotiations — his ego as “President of Peace” would not allow it. And it counts on European support to sustain the war effort while talks drag on. Putin, in turn, seems to calculate that time is playing in his favor: that the continuation of the conflict will allow him to advance on the map without having to compromise on the table.
If nothing changes, peace still seems far away.
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