Not even the United Kingdom is an island anymore

In February 2016, then-British Prime Minister David Cameron announced a referendum on whether the United Kingdom would remain in the European Union. The consultation took place on June 23 of that year and the 51.9% vote in favor of leaving opened a political, economic and strategic cycle, the consequences of which continue to shape the United Kingdom and Europe.

The central argument of defenders of “Leave” was simple: regain control over laws, borders and the Budget, accompanied by the promise to conclude new global trade agreements.

A decade after the decision to call the referendum, the assessment requires more than slogans.

From an economic point of view, the United Kingdom recorded lower relative growth compared to other advanced European economies. Trade with the European Union, which is its main partner, has become more bureaucratic and costly. Small and medium-sized exporting companies face new administrative costs, supply chains have been forced to reorganize and the financial sector has lost some of the activity that moved to Frankfurt, Paris or Amsterdam. The trade agreement signed with Brussels avoided tariffs, but did not eliminate regulatory frictions, nor compensate for the loss of full access to the single market.

On the domestic political level, the Brexit reopened territorial fissures. In Scotland – which voted overwhelmingly to remain in 2016 and which, in the 2014 independence referendum, continued membership in the United Kingdom was defended as necessary to remain in the European Union – the debate over the future relationship with London was reignited. In Northern Ireland, the special status agreed to avoid a physical border with the Republic of Ireland created a regulatory border within the United Kingdom itself and became a focus of internal and external political tension, requiring successive diplomatic adjustments. The promise to regain control translated, paradoxically, into complex legal commitments, in which London ended up accepting limitations that it previously rejected.

At the strategic level, the ambition of a “Global Britain” confronted geopolitical reality. The United Kingdom concluded relevant trade agreements, including joining the Trans-Pacific Pact, but none fully compensated for the economic, regulatory density and geographic proximity of the European market. And the war in Ukraine and the intensification of systemic competition between the United States and China showed that interdependence is not an ideological option, but a structural condition of the 21st century.

None of this means that the UK has lost relevance. It remains a nuclear power, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a global financial center and a top-tier diplomatic actor. However, the idea that he could thrive by isolating himself from his surroundings proved elusive. Value chains are transnational, migration flows respond to deep demographic dynamics and climate, energy and digital challenges ignore borders.

But the main lesson of Brexit it lies not in their economic costs or political consequences, but rather in the way structural decisions can be shaped by identity cleavages and perceptions of loss of control. Mature democracies are not immune to simplification campaigns that transform complex issues into binary choices.

Ten years after the referendum was announced, it is clear that neither the United Kingdom is an island, nor is sovereignty exercised through distance, but through the ability to shape interdependencies. In a world where certainties dissipate and the future becomes increasingly uncertain, leaving can be seemingly easy. Rebuilding bridges is more difficult.

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