The European Union took a step towards the precipice when, after more than 25 years of negotiations, it transformed the agreement with Mercosur into an internal institutional problem. A week after the President of the European Commission traveled to Paraguay to sign one of the most relevant trade and geopolitical agreements of recent decades, the European Parliament decided to refer the text to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The predictable result is a period of between 18 and 24 months of legal uncertainty, political paralysis and accelerated erosion of the Union’s external credibility.
In a world marked by the fragmentation of alliances, open competition between blocs and the reconfiguration of the international system, the European Union is involved in indecision over an agreement that is not just a commercial instrument, but a geopolitical asset, a strategic signal directed to South America and an external anchor at a time when Europe needs to clearly assert its economic, political and normative role.
This blockade comes in a particularly sensitive electoral context and at a time of profound weakening of multilateralism. As several Member States enter electoral cycles marked by the erosion of the political center, the difficulty in building compromises and the growing pressure from populist and Eurosceptic forces, the agreement with Mercosur has become a symbol of globalization presented as a threat. This fuels simplistic, defensive and economically short-sighted discourses.
The decision to refer the agreement to the Court does not result from substantive doubts regarding its legality, but from the inability to politically resolve tensions between national interests, legitimate environmental agendas, sectoral pressures and short-term electoral calculations. The Court thus appears to be used as an instrument for postponing a debate that is political and not legal.
The consequences are serious. Externally, the perception is reinforced that the European Union is an unpredictable partner, capable of politically reopening processes concluded after decades of technical negotiation, consolidating the image of a Europe that is closed, slow and incapable of acting as a coherent strategic actor.
Internally, if the European Commission or the Council choose to ignore, bypass or politically empty the European Parliament or a possible decision by the Court, the problem is no longer just one of external credibility and becomes one of institutional integrity, calling into question the balance between institutions, the predictability of the decision-making process and respect for the separation of competences enshrined in the Treaties.
There is, however, a positive sign in the signing of the agreement with India, which shows that Europe continues to be present, active and relevant in a world undergoing accelerated recovery. This is an agreement with significant economic, political and geostrategic reach, which confirms the European intention to diversify partnerships, reduce dependencies and assert itself as an autonomous hub in the international system. But if the fate of the agreement with India is similar to that of Mercosur, from political signature followed by institutional blockade, strategic judicialization to prolonged paralysis, then the European Union will no longer be just on the edge of the precipice. You will have taken a step forward.
In an international system marked by competition between blocs and the acceleration of strategic decisions, the Union’s external presence is not measured by the number of agreements signed, but by its ability to ratify, implement and politically defend them. The alternative is no longer between openness and protection, but between leadership and irrelevance. And this choice cannot continue to be postponed without structural costs.
Guest professor UCP/UNL/UÉ
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