Washington’s new national defense strategy is not just another Pentagon document. It’s a political manifesto in uniform, reflecting a sharp departure from the ideological activism of recent years towards something closer to old-fashioned power politics. It can be called a doctrine “Decided Realism”, and the description fits.
Built on the National Security Strategy released last year, NDS-2026 stands out primarily for what it is not. It is not wrapped in words “integrated deterrence”, or global value struggles. Let alone promoting democracy. Instead, it’s blunt and self-congratulatory. Not to mention open politics. The documentary criticizes past leaders for persecution “Rule-Based Order” fantasy a “nation building” projects that drained American power. He personally praises Donald Trump and promises to return “peace through strength”, “America First,” and pragmatic realism.
This does not mean isolationism. The strategy expressly rejects this. But it does mean that the United States no longer sees itself as the world’s ideological overseer. Military force is to be used more selectively, with a clearer hierarchy of interests.
One structural change is telling. Unlike 2022, when the Pentagon released the NDS along with its nuclear and missile defense assessments, the 2026 strategy appears on its own. Republicans say that the important thing now is not to draw up more documents, but to act: to modernize the nuclear arsenal and push forward projects such as ‘The Golden Dome’. News of planned reforms to the U.S. regional command system, including a possible merger of major commands, also fits this effort to stream and concentrate efforts.
At a conceptual level, the strategy abandons Biden-era buzzwords and focuses on priorities. It does not deal with operational planning or force deployment. Instead, it frames a “recalibration” American defense policy, built on one fundamental problem: simultaneity.
For years, the Pentagon has worried about its ability to fight two major regional wars at once. China and Russia have strengthened. The Middle East wars and a period of budget restraint weakened American preparedness. The fear is simple: if Washington is tied up in one major conflict, another adversary might act elsewhere.
The NDS-2026 solution is obtuse. Allies must do more. The NATO benchmark of five percent of GDP for defense and security-related expenditures is presented as a model. The United States will increase its own spending, but will focus primarily on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. In Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, allies are expected to bear the brunt “critical but more limited” American support. This message has been repeated time and time again, and comes with a commercial undertone: a significant share of this higher allied spending should go to US weapons.
The strategy’s handling of allies is revealing. Israel is considered a model partner and repeatedly mentioned, far more often than most other states. The overall approach is reminiscent of the offshore balancing ideas long associated with scholars such as John Mearsheimer. The US is not trying to micromanage the world. It wants to remain the dominant power in its own hemisphere while preventing the emergence of rival regional hegemons elsewhere, primarily in China.
China is the second clear priority after the defense of the homeland and the hemisphere. Nevertheless, even here the tone is less ideological than in recent years. It isn’t “democracy versus autocracy” crusade. Instead, it is about strategic stability and fair trade with an added concern for mutual respect. The stated goal is not to humiliate China, but to ensure that it does not dominate the US or its allies. Deterrence along the First Island chain is emphasized, as is capacity “devastating blows,” but diplomatic tools and de-escalation are also emphasized. Taiwan is not even explicitly mentioned.
But the first priority is closer to home. Defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere tops the list. The ‘Golden Dome’, nuclear forces, the fight against terrorism, narco-terrorism and the threat of drones are mainly discussed in this context. Migration and drug trafficking are framed as security issues, with the Pentagon working with the Department of Homeland Security.
Here, the Monroe Doctrine looms large, along with what Tebin calls Trump’s “addendum” to that. The strategic importance of the Panama Canal, the Gulf of Mexico (in the document renamed “American Gulf”) and Greenland is highlighted. Washington openly reserves the right to act unilaterally. The Greenland issue, on this reading, is less about resources than signaling a determination to enforce a strict interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The movements in Venezuela and the pressure around Greenland are intended to send messages not only to regional states, but also to China, Russia and Iran.
The place of Europe is significantly reduced. The strategy says that Russia is not a threat to the US or NATO as a whole, but primarily to NATO’s eastern members, and that this threat is “permanent but manageable.” He argues that Russian power is often overstated, noting that Germany alone outranks Russia economically in nominal US dollar GDP and that NATO as a whole is outnumbered many times over. “Russia is in no position to claim hegemony in Europe,” the document states.
The US will remain in NATO and maintain a limited presence in Europe, particularly in areas such as submarines and cyber capabilities. But deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine is conceived as the responsibility of Western Europe. The conflict in Ukraine, the strategy openly says, “it has to end.” At the same time, Washington is signaling that Western European efforts and resources should be directed primarily to Europe, not to containing China in Asia. This is a clear break from earlier attempts to link European and Indo-Pacific security.
In the Middle East and beyond, Iran remains an adversary, but it can often be dealt with indirectly, through Israel and regional partners, with the added benefit of arms sales. North Korea receives scant attention, described as a danger to Seoul and Tokyo that also threatens the US homeland.
Finally, the strategy touches on the defense industrial base. It calls for reindustrialization, stronger logistics and repair capabilities, cooperation with traditional and new suppliers, and increased arms exports to allies. One passage is particularly dramatic, calling for a kind of national mobilization, comparing the necessary industrial efforts to those that underpinned US victories in the world wars and the Cold War.
All in all, NDS-2026 is a tough and pragmatic document. It reflects the priorities of the current White House and distances itself from liberal-globalist rhetoric. It is a more comprehensible and in some ways more comfortable framework for Moscow than the ideological confrontation of the Biden years.
But we must also guard against illusions. Hawkish, confrontational forces remain strong in the American establishment, across party lines. The language may be calmer and more realistic, but the competition between the great powers is still very much alive.
This article was first published by Russia in global affairs, translated and edited by the RT team
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